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1. Introduction
Around the world, freedom of information legislation seeks primarily to make the
workings of government more open, transparent and accountable. It is not primarily
intended to provide access to information about organisations within the private
sector. The debate around freedom of information is couched in terms of access to
information from and about government and public sector authorities. For just one
of many examples, see the comments by the Minster introducing the Freedom of
information Bill in Parliament: “Unnecessary secrecy in Government and our public
services has long been held to undermine good governance and public
administration”.1
The enactment of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) has been described
as a “significant step” in widening access to government information, a process
which had begun with the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, because
for the first time the right of access was general, not limited by its subject matter or
by the persons who could exercise the right2.
That widening of access is important and it has meant that vastly more information
about the workings of government has been released. However it does not mean
that FOIA is only relevant to the public sector. Examination of the legislation and of
the growing volume of case law shows that it has a significant impact on the private
sector, and on organisations which could be said to straddle the public/private
divide: privatised companies such as the utility companies, carrying out functions
which were previously within the remit of the public sector; other private companies
which have taken on public sector contracts under contracting-out and PFI/PPP
initiatives; quangos; and in recent years organisations such as banks, previously
firmly in the private sector, which have received quantities of public money and
some degree of government influence (if not control3) over their activities.
This paper discusses two aspects of the impact which freedom of information
legislation has had on private sector organisations:
1. the extent to which private sector bodies carrying out some form of public
function are, or could become, directly subject to FOIA and the Environmental
Information Regulations 2004 (“EIR”); and
1 Jack Straw MP, Hansard HC 340 col 714 (emphasis added)
2 Coppel, Information Rights Law and Practice at 1-002.
3 For an interesting commentary see Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information: the Law, the Practice and
the Ideal at 359 et seq
2. the extent to which information about private sector bodies can be
accessed through FOIA
2. Which bodies are subject to the legislation?
The idea that organisations within the private sector might be subject to the access
regimes was present right from the outset. In the White Paper which preceded FOIA,
the government sought to include the privatised utilities and “private organisations
insofar as they carry out statutory functions within the ambit of the legislation”4.
However that intention did not survive into the legislation. In the event both FOIA
and the EIR were written to apply directly only to “public authorities”. But the way in
which use of the term is structured is significantly different between the two
regimes.
FOIA s 1 provides that “any person making a request for information to a public
authority is entitled (a) to be informed…whether it holds information of the
description specified in the request, and (b)if that is the case, to have that
information communicated to him.” The term “public authority” is defined in s 3 (1)
as “(a) any body which, any other person who, or the holder of any office which (i) is
listed in Schedule 1, or (ii) is designated by order under section 5, or (b) a publicly-
owned company.”
The approach in FOIA is to provide a complete list of all the public authorities to
which it applies. Schedule 1 does list many of these by category5 but many are
named individually. The list of individual bodies to which the Act applies6 is very long
and includes large numbers of non-governmental and quasi governmental bodies
such as advisory committees. Bodies can be added to Schedule 1 by the Secretary of
State under s 4, principally where new authorities are established. This power has
been used many times. In addition the Secretary of State can designate other bodies
as being public authorities for the purpose of the Act, under s 5 (1). This power arises
where the body “(a) appears to the Secretary of State to exercise functions of a
public nature, or (b) is providing under a contract made with a public authority any
service whose provision is a function of that authority”.
Of course the disadvantage of this approach is that bodies which might appear to be
exercising public functions are not included unless and until they are added under s4
or designated under s5. Given the political significance of inclusion within FOIA,
proposals have been put forward at various times for the designation of bodies
which appear to exercise some form of public role: Network Rail, Northern Rock, the
Press Complaints Commission, the Association of Chief Police Officers and others.
However while the extension to ACPO appears to be going ahead together with a
4 Your Right to Know: The Government’s Proposals for a Freedom of Information Act Cm 3318 (1997)
at 2.2
5 Eg Schedule 1 Part 1 “any government department...”
6 Listed in Schedule 1 Part VI, with a further list in Part VII for bodies in Northern Ireland
range of other regulatory bodies7, others are not. Both the Conservatives and the
Liberal Democrats said prior to the 2010 General Election that they would add
Network Rail; the Conservatives also planned to add Northern Rock. It appears that
these are not now going ahead8. In Scotland, the situation is much the same. The
Scottish Government announced in December 2009 that it was considering
extending the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act (which applies to Scottish
Public Authorities) to contractors who build or maintain hospitals or schools, who
operate or maintain trunk roads under PFI contracts, and who run privately managed
prisons or prison escort services. These proposals appeared to be quite detailed and
to have reached an advanced stage. However in January 2011 it was announced that
they would not be taken forward, a decision that the Scottish Information
Commissioner described as a “worrying slide to less freedom of information”9.
The position under EIR is structurally different, in that there is no list of public
authorities but a definition. A public authority is defined in Regulation 2 (2) as “(a)
government departments; (b) public authorities as defined in s 3 FOIA (which will
therefore incorporate the list): (c) any other body or other person, that carries out
functions of public administration; and (d) any other body or other person under the
control of a person falling within (a) (b) or (c) and which has public responsibilities
relating to the environment; exercises functions of a public nature relating to the
environment, or provides public services relating to the environment.”
Deciding whether a body is a public authority for the EIR therefore depends not
solely on a list but on whether the body falls within the definition.
This definition derives directly from the Aarhus Convention10 but its apparent
breadth has been narrowed considerably by the Upper Tribunal recently.
In Smartsource v Information Commissioner11 the Upper Tribunal held that privatised
water companies were not public authorities for the purposes of the EIR.
The UT decision involves a detailed and closely argued analysis of the Aarhus
Convention12, Directive 2003/04/EC13, the Aarhus Implementation Guide14, DEFRA’s
guidance on the EIR15, and a significant quantity of statute and case law, including
the two leading previous decisions of the Information Tribunal on the matter,
Network Rail16 and Port of London Authority17. Despite several references in the
7 See MOJ press release 7 January 2011. The other bodies include the Law Society and Advertising
Standards Authority
8 They are not listed in the MOJ proposals.
9 Kevin Dunion, Scotland on Sunday 5 March 2011
10 Aarhus Convention article 2.2
11 [2010] UKUT 415 (AAC)
12 Available at http://www.unece.org
13 Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:041:0026:0032:EN:PDF
14 http://www.unece.org/env/pp/acig.htm
15 Available at http://archive.defra.gov.uk/corporate/policy/opengov/eir/guidance/full-
guidance/pdf/guidance-2.pdf
16 Network Rail Ltd v Information Commissioner EA/2006/0061 and EA/2006/0062
17 Port of London Authority v Information Commissioner EA/2006/0083
Aarhus Implementation Guide to the possibility of privatised utilities being subject to
access regimes, the Upper Tribunal held that the water companies were not carrying
out “functions of public administration” for the purposes of regulation 2 (2) (c). The
requirement was not the carrying out of public functions, but functions of public
administration. On this basis the water companies were not public authorities. No
single factor was decisive. Instead the Tribunal adopted a “multi factor” approach,
comparing features of the water companies with Network Rail (which had been held
not to carry out functions of public administration) and assessing whether they were
more or less like a public authority than Network Rail was. On balance, it was held
that the water companies had fewer characteristics of public authorities than did
Network Rail. Nor did the fact that they were subject to detailed regulation by the
Secretary of State and/or OFWAT mean that they were “under the control of” those
bodies to bring them within regulation 2 (2) (d), even though they clearly provide
public services related to the environment.
It is difficult to argue with this as the correct legal outcome of the case, given the
wording of the regulations and the preceding case law. However it seems equally
clear that even though they are private companies, the water companies’ functions
are exactly the sort of functions which are so crucial to the environment that they
should be encompassed by the EIR. This argument is alluded to by the Upper
Tribunal, in a postscript to its judgement:
“107 The Aarhus Guide suggests as follows….:
“Implementation of the Convention would be improved if Parties
clarified which entities are covered by this subparagraph. This could be
done through categories or lists made available to the public.”
108 The DEFRA guidance states that there can be “ no comprehensive list of
those bodies that are under the control of another body because such relations
are dynamic and are prone to frequent change” (paragraph 2.21, original
emphasis). Clearly the authors of the Aarhus Guide did not see that as an
insuperable problem. In addition, while it may be a valid argument against
having an authoritative list of public authorities in primary legislation, on the
same model as FOIA 2000 , it would not preclude such a list being kept up to
date through secondary legislation. However, that is a matter for others to
determine.”18
Neither model of determining which bodies are “public authorities” is perfect. The
FOIA model is clear but dependent on a political assessment of whether to add
bodies to the list. The EIR model offers less scope for political decision making but its
drafting is open to interpretation in ways which do not always make sense of the
underlying purpose of the regulations.
18 Smartsource v IC [2010] UKUT 415 at paragraph 107
The government’s intention at the moment appears to be not to bring private
commercial bodies within the legislation, even those which are providing services
which previously were regarded very much as public functions. This is in part a
reflection of changing times and the ongoing impact of privatisation. As the
Information Tribunal pointed out in the Network Rail case “Whatever the position in
1947, running a railway is not seen nowadays in the United Kingdom as a function
normally performed by a government authority.”19 However, where should the line
be drawn? It could be argued that, certainly in relation to environmental
information, the crucial factor is what the information is about, rather than the exact
nature of the body holding it. That argument is less clear in relation to FOIA. Making
access dependent on the type of information held or service provided rather than on
the public nature of the holder might lead to a lack of certainty and in many ways
would be a retrograde step (see the comments from Coppel, supra). But more could
certainly be done to extend the regimes to bodies which do carry out public
functions.
One avenue which could and perhaps should be explored is extending the category
of public authorities which are only partly subject to the legislation. There is
precedent for this approach under FOIA. The BBC is the most widely known, in that it
is subject to FOIA in respect of information held for purposes other than those of
journalism art or literature20. But there are many other organisations which are
“public authorities” for only part of their activities, including the Bank of England. It
should not be impossible to devise a scheme for more borderline bodies, which carry
out some public functions but do not fit comfortably within the category of public
authorities, to be partly covered by FOIA rather than wholly excluded. The Tribunal
however rejected this approach in Smartsource in relation to the EIR, concluding that
as a matter of statutory interpretation, regulation 2 did not suggest that a body
could be simultaneously both within and outside the EIR21 .
3. Access to commercial information
Although bodies which are not “public authorities” are not directly subject to FOIA or
the EIR, information which they have provided to a public authority will generally be
regarded as “held” by the authority and therefore potentially releasable to a
requester, subject to any exemptions which might apply. Issues here have arisen
mostly in the context of contracts between public authorities and private bodies, and
information supplied during procurement processes. The next section of this paper
examines FOIA exemptions as they apply these public/private contracts.
3.1 The exemptions
The most important exemptions in this context are likely to be FOIA s 41 and 43.
Under FOIA s 41(1), information is exempt if “(a) it was obtained by the public
19 Network Rail Ltd v Information Commissioner EA/2006/0061 at paragraph 29
20 FOIA Schedule 1 Part VI
21 Smartsource v IC [2010] UKUT 415 at paragraph 104.
authority from any other person (including another public authority) and (b) the
disclosure of the information.. by the public authority.. would constitute a breach of
confidence actionable by that or any other person.” Section 41 is an absolute
exemption (so no application of the public interest test is required).
Section 43(1) FOIA is a qualified exemption (requiring application of the public
interest test) protecting trade secrets. Section 43(2) is also qualified, and exempts
information if its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial
interests of any person (including the public authority holding it).
There are broadly equivalent (but not identical) exceptions under the EIR22. As has
been noted by several commentators23 the confidentiality exemptions under the EIR
are materially narrower than those under FOIA, by largely excluding private
information24.
3.2 Confidential information
The reference in s 41 to an “actionable breach of confidence” means that the
common law case law on breach of confidence is imported into FOIA. This requires
that the information: has the necessary quality of confidence; was communicated in
circumstances which created an obligation of confidentiality; and that disclosure
would be a breach of that obligation25. In addition there will be no actionable breach
if it is in the public interest for the information to be disclosed, thereby introducing a
public interest test into what otherwise appears in FOIA as an absolute exemption.
Detailed discussion of the common law rules on breach of confidence is beyond the
scope of this paper, but some of the FOIA case law applying those rules is
noteworthy.
22 Regulation 12 (5) provides that a public authority may refuse (subject always to the public interest
test) to disclose information to the extent that its disclosure would adversely affect (inter alia):
(c) intellectual property rights;
(e) the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information where such confidentiality is provided
by law to protect a legitimate economic interest;
(f) the interests of the person who provided the information where that person—
(i)was not under, and could not have been put under, any legal obligation to supply it to that or any
other public authority;(ii)did not supply it in circumstances such that that or any other public
authority is entitled apart from these Regulations to disclose it; and (iii)has not consented to its
disclosure
23 See Richard Spearman QC in Coppel Information Rights Law and Practice at 25-065
24 Limitations of time and space preclude consideration of the EIR exceptions here but they will
appear in a later extended version of this paper.
25 See Coco v AN Clarke(Engineers) Limited [1969] RPC 41, Derry City Council v IC EA/2006/0014
One of the interesting differences between FOIA and the case law on commercial
confidentiality outside FOIA is the relative frequency of FOIA cases in this area26,
although as the FOIA case law is largely at tribunal level its precedent value
elsewhere is limited. Another interesting difference is in the relationship between
the parties to the case. Outside FOIA, the confidentiality obligation is one which is
created by and between the parties to the original provision of information, either
by contract or in equity. The disclosure, or potential disclosure, of the information
tends to result from the breakdown of their relationship and the consequent
decision of one party either to release the information or to use it for their own
benefit – as in the leading case of Coco v Clarke27, which arose from the breakdown
of a partnership agreement. Often the cases are between an employer and a former
employee who is in possession of confidential information28. Only rarely does the
information fall into the hands of a third party, and even if it does, they will only be
liable for breach of confidence if the manner in which they obtained the information
placed them under a duty of confidence29.
Under FOIA, by contrast, the information is sought by a third party, who could be a
competitor or a member of the public. In most cases neither of the original parties to
the confidentiality agreement wishes it to be released. For example, many FOIA
requests are made by unsuccessful bidders for public sector contracts, seeking more
information about the successful bid and the decision making process than is
otherwise available to them30.
The fact that most of the previous cases involved a breakdown in a relationship and
subsequent breach of contract by the defendant is perhaps one reason why many
public authorities and their private sector contractors have placed so much reliance
on contractual confidentiality clauses, expecting that while both parties abided by
the contract, material in it, or referred to in it, as “confidential” would be treated by
the courts as such. The early FOIA jurisprudence on section 41 therefore came as
something of an unwelcome surprise.
The first important issue here was the whether an entire contract between a public
authority and a third party could be confidential. In order to rely on s41 the
information must have been obtained by the public authority from another
person31. In Derry City Council v The Information Commissioner32 the Tribunal
upheld the IC decision that a written agreement between two parties (in this case, a
contract between the Council and Ryanair) did not constitute information provided
26 There have been significant developments in the common law of confidence in recent years, but
the cases have mostly concerned private information about individuals rather than commercial
confidentiality
27 Coco v AN Clarke(Engineers) Limited [1969] RPC 41
28 See for example Faccenda Chicken v Fowler [1987] RPC 449
29 The most common case law example being photographers taking pictures of celebrities, as in
Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22
30 Under the Public Contracts Regulations 2006. See the interesting discussion in Public Procurement
Law Review 2010,4, NA 148-152
31 S 41(1)(a)
32 EA/2006/0014
by one of them to the other, and that therefore, a concluded contract between a
public authority and a third party does not fall within section 41(1)(a) of the Act.
The Tribunal stated that “we are aware that the effect of our conclusion is that the
whole of any contract with a public authority may be available to the public, no
matter how confidential the content or how clearly expressed the confidentiality
provisions incorporated in it, unless another exemption applies.”33
A very sweeping statement, but tempered by the recognition just a few paragraphs
later that a contract might in reality contain genuinely confidential technical
information provided by the contracting party, or information regarding a pre-
contract negotiating position, which could be redacted and not disclosed.
The same general statements about the disclosability of the entire contract were
repeated by the Tribunal in the Department of Health case34 which involved a
request for the contract between the Department and a private contractor for the
provision of an E-Recruitment service for the NHS .
The Commissioner and the Tribunal have in numerous decisions reiterated some
basic points about confidentiality which previously had perhaps been overlooked by
public authorities and those dealing with them: that labelling information as
“confidential” does not make it such35; that information ceases to be confidential
once it is in the public domain; and that information can cease to be confidential
with the passage of time36.
Overall, this robust approach means that the s41 exemption has been successfully
relied on to resist the disclosure of commercial information in only a relatively small
number of cases. These have been situations where the information was objectively
confidential, and where the public interest in releasing the information was held not
to outweigh the duty of confidentiality so that there would have been an actionable
breach of confidence if the information was disclosed. For example reports delivered
to public authorities under express confidentiality terms37 with significant public
interest weight, and detailed economic models and costings38, although even the
latter tend to have been dealt with under s43(2).
3.3 Section 43(2)39
33 Ibid at paragraph 13(e)
34 Department of Health v IC EA/2008/0018
35 See DTI FS 50069394; also Derry City Council, supra
36 Eg valuation information see Oxford City Council FS500090744
37 As in Boston BC FS50064851; NICE FS50082569
38 As in FSA FS 50094583
39 The line between trade secrets and confidential information is a narrow and not very well-defined
one, and most of the issues which could potentially have been dealt with as trade secrets have tended
to be dealt with under s 41. So the discussion here will cover s 43(2) only. Again the extended version
of this paper will examine this in more detail.
Very often cases where s 41 is claimed also involve s 43(2), as the information which
is claimed as confidential is also claimed as information, the disclosure of which
would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person. As
noted above, the s41 exemption will not apply to the contract itself, but s 43(2) can
still apply.
In an early Information Tribunal case John Connor Press Associates v IC40 the Tribunal
ordered the release of financial information about payments made by the National
Maritime Museum to an artist for an exhibition. The argument that this was a
disclosure which would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of
the museum was rejected. This rejection of the s 43(2) exemption caused some
consternation. However the Tribunal’s reasoning was perhaps more limited to its
particular facts than some commentators suggested. While it is true that the
interpretation of the phrase “likely to prejudice” as meaning a “real and significant
risk” meant that organisations might find it difficult to succeed in a s 43(2) argument,
the facts here were quite unusual. The National Maritime Museum had already
released a good deal of relevant financial information, and in particular had
disclosed some of the unusual features of this agreement, making the commercial
value of the further information it wanted to withhold rather limited.
Further cases on similar facts illustrate that in appropriate circumstances the
Tribunal is willing to accept s 43 (2) arguments, including cases where the section 41
exemption is rejected.
In the Department of Health case41, involving a contract between the Department
and a private contractor, although the contract was held not to be confidential, the
Tribunal also considered s 43. They held that although for the majority of the
contract terms the public interest lay in disclosure, for some of them the public
interest lay in withholding.
Again the Derry City Council case is relevant. The Tribunal considered that s 43 (2)
was engaged in relation to the commercial interests of the Council, although then
went on to decide that the balance of the public interest lay in disclosing the
relevant information. However they did not consider the commercial interests of
Ryanair – but indicated that this was because they had been given no evidence of
Ryanair’s commercial interests, rather than because such interests were not
relevant42.
The recent case of BBC and One Transport v IC 43 illustrates a seemingly ready
acceptance by the Tribunal of arguments on the prejudice to commercial interests,
where such arguments are supported by evidence. Here, the request was for the
amount paid by the BBC to a taxi company under contractual arrangements
following a tender process. The Tribunal accepted in full the argument that
40 EA/2005/0005
41 Supra at n 26
42 Derry case at paragraph 24 (b)
43 BBC and One Transport Limited v IC and Davis EA/2010/0150
disclosure would be likely to prejudice the BBC’s commercial interests in that it
would “set the expectation of what the BBC will pay for a service”44 and prevent the
BBC from obtaining best value for money; disclosure would also be likely to prejudice
the commercial interests of the taxi company by providing a mechanism by which its
competitors could work out its pricing structures. There was held to be a clear public
interest in a genuinely open, fair and competitive tendering process, which would be
hindered rather than helped by release of this pricing information.
There are still cases where disclosure is ordered of commercial items the parties do
not wish to release: in Channel 4 v IC45 it was held that the entirety of a contract
could not be withheld under s 43(2): the individual clauses must be examined and
justified individually. But overall the fears of private sector contractors do not
currently seem to be borne out by the cases: where information is genuinely
commercially sensitive the exemption will be applied, and more readily than under s
41.
3.4 Other recent case law on commercial information
The position of the parties to commercial contracts has arguably been considerably
strengthened by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Veolia v Nottinghamshire
County Council46. This involved an ingenious attempt by an environmental
campaigner to access confidential commercial information (details of a multi-million
pound waste management contract) via the previously little used s 15 of the Audit
Commission Act 1998 rather than FOIA or the EIR. S15 gives a right to “any persons
interested” to inspect the accounts of a local authority for a limited period at the
time of the annual audit. That right extends to inspection not only of the accounts
but also of contracts “relating to” the accounts. Cranston J at first instance47 had
held that this included the contracts and related financial documentation. The Court
of Appeal, however, held that s15 had to be read in a way which would preserve the
confidentiality of the company’s confidential information. They held that the
company had a right under the ECHR to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions, that
this right extended to its commercially valuable confidential information, and that
therefore the Council had to carry out a balancing act, assessing whether the public
interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighed the public interest in disclosure.
On this basis, the financial information was protected from disclosure.
In two related cases, the Tribunal has followed this lead. In Staffordshire CC v IC and
Sibelco48 a quarry operator had voluntarily provided the council with information
about its sales and reserves, on the basis of strict and specific obligations of
confidentiality. The tribunal followed the reasoning in Veolia and held that the public
44 BBC, ibid at para 25
45 EA/2010/0134
46 [2010] EWCA 1214
47 [2009] 2382 (Admin)
48 EA/2010/0015
interest favoured the maintenance of the exemptions in regulations 12 (e) and (f)
EIR.
These decisions would appear to herald a new direction for the protection for
commercially confidential information, by engaging the human rights of the owner
of the information and reading access rights as subject to an exception.
That said, the tribunal in Nottinghamshire CC v IC and Veolia49 held that while the
ECHR rights could be engaged, in reality that would add little to the analysis and the
balancing act already required for the public interest test under FOIA.
The conclusion to be drawn from recent developments seems to be that after a few
false starts, where the Courts and the Tribunal reached decisions which were
justified in law but caused consternation to private organisations because they did
not reflect widespread practices, the practice and the case law are now more closely
aligned. Genuinely confidential information, and information which would genuinely
prejudice commercial interests if released, will be protected against disclosure.
However what counts as confidential information is narrower than was often
supposed, and the evidence of prejudice must be clear. Commercial parties (and the
public authorities dealing with them) still need to be more careful not to commit
basic errors of the type which plagued early tribunal cases. Claiming blanket
exemptions for whole contracts or all the information provided in connection with
them, rather than identifying genuinely sensitive areas; placing supposedly
“confidential” information on their websites or otherwise into the public domain;
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